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Managerial Ownership, Corporate Monitoring and Audit Pricing  
 
Abstract: 
 
We study whether managerial ownership and corporate monitoring (board quality and analyst coverage) 
relate to audit pricing.  Managerial ownership has been identified as a fraud risk factor under SAS 99. 
However, the role of ownership is not clear. Under an alignment view, high levels of stock ownership 
align management with shareholders.  Under an entrenchment view, high levels of ownership may 
motivate management to be self interested.  Corporate monitoring, as measured by analyst coverage and 
overall board quality (Gomper’s index), are associated with information quality.  Audit pricing will be 
affected to the extent that auditors perceive monitoring as being relevant to managers’ reporting 
incentives.  Our tests use a large sample over the period of 2000-2004 and control for regulatory changes 
over that period.  Our results indicate that lower fees are associated with higher levels of management 
ownership.  We also find a negative relationship between fees and measures of corporate monitoring. 
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Managerial Ownership, Corporate Monitoring and Audit Pricing  
 
1. Introduction 
Auditors are a unique type of insider with both access to information and specialized knowledge.  
Although the primary product of the auditor/client relationship is the audit report, an auditor may convey 
information to the markets about the client through audit pricing.  We study whether managerial ownership 
and corporate monitoring (i.e., shareholder rights and analyst coverage) relate to audit pricing. Extant 
literature on audit pricing identifies a host of firm characteristics that determine audit pricing (e.g. Defond 
2002, Whisenant et al. 2003, Francis and Wang 2005).  Hay et al. (2006) call for additional research on how 
corporate governance factors influences fees.  The primary governance studies in the audit fee literature have 
primarily focused on audit committee characteristics (Carcello et al. 2002; Abbott et al, 2003), CEO 
domination (Tsui et al. 2001), and how factors identified on client acceptance checklists impact planned fees 
(Bedard and Johnstone 2004).  This study examines whether auditors price level of managerial ownership, a 
fraud risk factor under Statement of Auditing Standards 99 “Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement 
Audit”; external monitoring as measured by analyst coverage; and overall board quality as measured by the 
Gomper’s index (Gompers et al., 2003), all factors associated with information quality (e.g., Warfield et al. 
1995, LaFond and Roychowdhury 2008, Yu 2008).  To the extent that auditors perceive these firm 
characteristics as being relevant to managers’ financial reporting incentives, audit pricing will be influenced 
by those factors. This motivates our investigation. 
In the wake of corporate scandals at the turn of the century, corporate governance and auditor 
behavior have received a considerable amount of attention from academics and regulators. Understanding 
auditors’ fee setting mechanisms in general, and more specifically, how auditors price firm governance 
characteristics, is important for several reasons. First, since fees have been used in research as a proxy for 
auditor independence (Frankel et al. 2002, Defond et al., 2002, Ashbaugh et al., 2003, Higgs and Skantz 2006) 
to assess possible bonding between the client and the auditor, identifying factors that determine the “normal” 
level of fees is important.  Second, we extend the existing literature on corporate governance by providing 
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evidence on how auditors, one important stakeholder group of the company, associate corporate governance 
characteristics with information risk of the firm’s financial reporting system (Bedard and Johnstone, 2004; 
Carcello, et al, 2002; Tsui, et al. 2001). Hay et al. (2006) note that additional research in the area of audit fees 
and governance could be useful (p.179). 
External audits contribute to financial reporting reliability by providing an independent assessment of 
the financial statements and internal controls (e.g., Abdel-Khalik and Solomon 1988).  In pricing an audit, fees 
are based on effort, level of personnel required to perform the job and risk and reward of working with the 
client (Dickens, et al., 2008).  Auditors are required to assess risks of material weaknesses and misstatements.  
Because these risks are partly unobservable, auditors may infer the likelihood of potential misstatement in the 
financial statements from corporate ownership and monitoring characteristics. That is, possible increases 
(reductions) in agency costs from managerial ownership (corporate monitoring) can be relevant to the 
assessment of financial reporting reliability, affecting audit pricing.   
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the demand for auditing results from a desire to reduce the 
management shirking which results from information asymmetries between shareholders and managers, and 
demonstrate that managers will voluntarily increase the observability of their actions by hiring independent 
auditors to monitor their actions. While this is likely to be the case when managers’ interests are aligned with 
those of shareholders, it is less likely when managers’ interests are entrenched. The literature generally 
suggests that managerial ownership can play a role in aligning managers’ interest with those of shareholders 
(the alignment view), but sometimes managers’ self-interest dominates (the entrenchment view). Under the 
alignment view, managerial ownership aligns the interests of managers and shareholders, reducing agency 
problems and improving a firm’s information quality (e.g., Warfield, et al. 1995, Han, Kang and Lobo 2008). 
Consistent with the entrenchment view, Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) associate poor financial reporting 
quality with equity-based compensation, and LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) find that accounting 
conservatism declines with managerial ownership. Consistent with the alignment view, Statement of Auditing 
Standards 99, “Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit,” specifically discusses how financial 
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interests of management are an incentive/pressure that should be considered when evaluating fraud risk 
(AICPA, AU 316.85 A.2.c). 
We also examine how auditors price shareholder rights in audit engagements. As Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2003) note, shareholder rights entitle shareholders to have control over the choice of directors, who 
delegate most decisions to managers. When shareholder rights are strong (weak), shareholders have a stronger 
(weaker) voice for the appointment and dismissal of management and can more (less) quickly and easily 
replace directors. Stronger shareholder rights might translate into less audit risk given that shareholder have 
more control (albeit “indirect” through their selection of director) over securing management who will work to 
maximize shareholder wealth. Managers who try to maximize shareholder wealth will likely provide higher 
quality disclosure as management has less to conceal from the public (i.e., fewer private control benefits). For 
this purpose, we use Gompers et al.’s G-Index (2003), which is an index of shareholder rights/governance. 
They construct the index by assigning points for provisions that restricts shareholder rights. 
Finally, we investigate the relation between analyst monitoring and audit fees (the analyst monitoring 
hypothesis). Prior research shows that financial analysts play a monitoring role in corporations (e.g., 
Knyazeva 2007, Yu 2008). The literature suggests that financial analysts who have financial expertise track 
corporate financial statements on a regular basis are likely to act as external monitors of managers (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976, Healy and Palepu 2001). As Yu (2008) notes, they tend to interact directly with management 
and raise questions on different aspects of earnings numbers through earnings release conferences. For 
example, it is known that financial analysts are directly involved in the discovery of corporate fraud in 
companies including Compaq, CVS, Electronic Data System, Gateway, Motorola, etc. (e.g., Dyck  et al. 2008). 
Yu’s evidence (2008) supports the monitoring hypothesis, indicating less earnings management as analyst 
coverage increases. Thus, it is possible that auditors perceive less audit risk in the presence of external 
monitoring by analysts. This leads us to predict that analyst coverage and audit fees will be negatively related. 
Our evidence shows the following. First, consistent with the alignment view of managerial ownership, 
it suggests that auditors charge less fees as managerial ownership increases, ceteris paribus. This suggests that 
auditors view managerial stock holdings as decreasing managerial incentives to misstate the financial 
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statements and hence audit risk. Second, audit fees decrease with shareholder rights, suggesting that auditors 
perceive less likelihood of misstatement when shareholders are more likely to exercise the authority to appoint 
a stronger board. Third, supporting the monitoring hypothesis, audit fee decreases with the extent of coverage 
by financial analysts who are known to play a corporate governance function (Knyazeva 2007, Yu 2008). 
By documenting these associations, we contribute to the literature in the following respects. First, we 
extend the literature on audit pricing of corporate governance characteristics (Tsui et al, 2001, Carcello et al. 
2002; Abbott et al. 2003, Bedard and Johnston 2004).1 While the prior studies in this line of research focus 
primarily on board and audit committee characteristics, we examine ownership characteristic (i.e., managerial 
ownership), broader set of corporate governance characteristics (as captured in the Gompers index) and the 
possible effects of analyst monitoring. Our evidence suggests that managerial holdings, shareholder rights, and 
analyst coverage are all priced by auditors. Specifically, our results suggest that auditors perceive lower audit 
risk when manager interests are aligned and corporate monitoring is strong. This study also contributes to the 
literature by identifying another economic benefit of having better corporate governance, i.e., lower audit fees. 
That is, better governance not only lowers cost of capital (e.g., Ashbaugh et al. 2004), increase firm value (e.g., 
Gompers et al. 2003, Core et al. 2006) but also reduces the amount of fees charged by the auditor. Third, 
unlike the evidence from market pricing tests of corporate governance, which are susceptible to endogeneity 
bias,2 our study provides evidence on how an important stakeholder group infers the likelihood of financial 
statement misstatement from corporate governance characteristics in a setting where such bias is less likely to 
be an issue. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop hypotheses. In Section 3, we describe the 
sample and the research design. In Section 4, we discuss the results. In Section 5, we conclude. 
 
2. Hypotheses Development 
                                                 
1 Exceptions are Palmrose (1986), who discusses and documents that auditors charge higher fees for public companies 
than for non-public companies due to greater risk exposure, and Han, Kang and Rees (2008) who show that short-term 
institutional ownership relates positively to audit fees. 
2 Here, the bias refers to the fact that it is not clear whether good corporate governance leads to higher firm value or firms 
with higher value adopt better governance, as those firms likely have more resources available to improve governance. 
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Simunic (1980), using survey data, examines empirically how audits are priced.  After February 2001, 
the SEC mandated that companies disclose fees paid to their auditor.  Since that time, a number of studies 
have examined the determinants of audit fees (Whisenant et al, 2003; Francis and Wang, 2005,).  Current 
models explain approximately 70-80% of the variation in audit fees (Whisenant et al., 2003, Francis and 
Wang, 2005).  Hay et al (2006), use a meta-analysis to identify the constructs identified in the literature that 
explain fees. 
Under the current audit standards, the auditor is required to report material misstatements whether due 
to error or fraud.3  As such, audit effort is going to be directed to areas that are deemed to be higher risk.  
Further, when the auditor is unable to adequately manage the higher risk through testing, fees will be adjusted 
upward.  Thus, we expect to see higher fees if the auditor has to do additional work (either because of 
complexity or risk) or if the auditor is charging the client a risk premium for risk that cannot be managed 
through additional testing.  Higher fees may also result because the audit committee requests the auditor to 
perform additional services in the conduct of the audit.  This is based on the premise that boards may demand 
differential levels of audit quality and the quality levels may not be directly observable. 
Recent research has begun to focus on the relationship between audit fees and corporate governance. 
Hay et al. (2006, p. 182) note the need to extend the fee model research in the area of corporate governance.  
Understanding the relationship between board quality and fees is difficult.  On the one hand, stronger 
governance, will lead to lower risk which will lead to lower fees.  However, audits are not commodities and 
strong audit committees may purchase more than normal amounts of audit services. 
Tsui et al. (2001) argue high quality corporate governance will result in better internal controls which 
in turn leads to lower risk and fees.  Their results indicate that firms with independent boards (without CEO 
domination) have lower fees.  Carcello et al. (2002) also find that board characteristics influence audit fees.  
However, they find a positive relationship between fees and strong governance characteristics -- board 
                                                 
3 Clients with a market capitalization in excess of $75 million are also required to get an audit of internal controls over 
financial reporting under the provisions of Section 404 of  the Sarbanes Oxley Act.  For simplicity, we focus the 
remainder of this discussion on the auditor’s opinion on financial reporting.    
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independence (outside directors), diligence (number of board meetings) and expertise (number of other 
positions held by non-management directors). 
Bedard and Johnston (2004) document a relationship between companies with higher corporate 
governance risk and planned audit fees suggesting that auditors factor in the quality of the board in hourly 
rates and number of planned hours. 
Abbott et al, (2003) conclude that there is a positive relationship between fees and audit committee 
independence, financial expertise and meeting frequency.  The results of their study suggest that strong audit 
committees purchase differential quality audits. 
This study examines other monitoring mechanisms that may influence the information environment, 
and hence the risk of the firm. The corporate governance characteristics we examine are managerial ownership; 
shareholder rights, as proxied by the Gompers index; and analyst coverage. 
The relation between the level of management ownership and managers’ commitment to improve 
shareholder wealth is not clear ex-ante (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976). On one hand, management equity 
ownership has the potential of aligning the interests of managers with those of shareholders, reducing the 
agency problem that arises from separation of ownership and control (the alignment hypothesis). As equity 
ownership increases, managers pay a larger share of the costs of deviating from value-maximization and thus 
are less likely to squander corporate wealth. In our context, the alignment hypothesis predicts that managers 
will be less likely to misstate earnings as (s)he is unlikely to accumulate private control benefits when the 
interests are aligned. 
On the other hand, below a certain threshold level of managerial ownership managers do not have 
sufficient claims on the outcome from their business decisions, managers may make decisions to optimize 
their personal benefit and make non-value-maximizing corporate decisions (the entrenchment hypothesis). 
This hypothesis predicts that managers will have an incentive to accumulate private control benefits and take 
actions, including possibly misstating the financial statement in order to conceal those benefits. 
The entrenchment hypothesis is consistent with a fraud risk factor outlined in Statement of Auditing 
Standards 99 (AU Section 360), “Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit.”  According to the 
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fraud theory, three elements must be present for fraud to occur:  incentives/pressure, opportunity, and 
rationalization.  SAS 99 lists some of the elements the auditor should be aware of when considering the 
possibility of fraudulent financial reporting.  Equity ownership and earnings targets by management are 
specifically listed as a fraud risk factor as a type of incentive or pressure.  Recent research has supported the 
inclusion of equity ownership as a fraud risk factor. Burns and Kedia (2006) find that the sensitivity of the 
CEO stock option portfolio is positively related to the propensity to misreport (magnitude of the restatement 
on income). Also, Cheng and Warfield (2005) find that equity incentives are associated with earnings 
management. 
To the extent that the auditors are aware of and factor in such managerial incentives to report 
faithfully depending on the level of management stock holdings, the fees charged will reflect the auditor 
assessment of audit risk. However, given that the association between managerial stock ownership and their 
incentives to misstate financial statements is not clear, we formulate our first hypothesis as non-directional: 
 
H1: Managerial stock ownership level relates to the fees charged by the auditor  
 
As noted earlier, the separation of ownership and control creates agency costs because managers 
pursue their own interests rather than those of the shareholders. If the shareholders have strong rights and 
hence are better able to monitor and discipline the managers, the divergence of interest can be reduced. In 
many cases, shareholder rights entitle shareholders to voice their opinions on the appointment and dismissal of 
management and replacement of directors. Since shareholder rights are not directly observable, we infer the 
balance of power between shareholders and managers from several corporate governance provisions 
(Gompers et al. 2003). 
The above reasoning suggests that an auditor’s perception of risk in conducting an audit might 
decrease with shareholder rights, ceteris paribus, given that the shareholders have more control (albeit 
“indirect” through their selection of director) over securing management who will work to maximize 
shareholder wealth. A manager who tries to maximize shareholder wealth and who likely accumulates less, if 
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not little, private control benefits and hence engages in more truthful reporting, lowers audit risk. This 
reasoning leads us to the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: The strength of shareholder rights relates negatively to the fees charged by the auditor  
 
Prior research suggests that financial analysts who have financial expertise track corporate financial 
statements on a regular basis are likely to act as external monitors of managers (Jensen and Meckling 1976, 
Healy and Palepu 2001). For instance, Knyazeva (2007) finds that greater intensity and quality of analyst 
following contributes to higher profits, lower degree of diversification, M&A activity, and investment, lower 
leverage and more equity issuance, higher cash holdings, and less earnings management. Since firm policies 
are relevant for future firm performance and part of analyst compensation relies on forecast precision, analysts 
have an incentive to analyze the effect of these policies on performance such as earnings (Knyazeva 2007). 
Consistent with this idea, Yu (2008) also finds that firms followed by more analysts manage their earnings 
less, suggesting that financial analysts play a monitoring role, constraining managers’ opportunistic reporting 
behavior. Thus, to the extent that managers have less incentive to engage in opportunistic earnings 
management, it is likely that auditors perceive less audit risk in the presence of external monitoring by 
analysts. This leads us to predict that analyst coverage and audit fees will be negatively related.4  
 
H3: Analyst coverage relates negatively to the fees charged by the auditor  
3.  Data and Research Design 
3.1 Sample Selection 
The sample used in this study is from six different databases and consists of 4,979 firm-year 
observations for the period 2000 to 2004. During this period, the fee structure of audits changed significantly 
                                                 
4 While we present a directional hypothesis, we recognize that studies on behavioral biases in analyst coverage, which 
includes investment banking affiliation and optimism (e.g., Lin and McNichols 1998, O’Brien, McNichols, and Lin 2005, 
Clarke and Subramanyam  2006), suggest possible conflicts of interest associated with analyst coverage. As Lin and 
McNichols (1998) note, analysts’ independence might be compromised in the presence of other interests such as 
investment banking relationship with the firm. To the extent that auditors price this factor, the predicted negative 
association between analyst coverage and audit fee in H3 will be attenuated. 
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due to several events.  The passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act had several ramifications.  Audit firms were no 
longer allowed to perform a variety of non-audit services thus impacting any fee dependence between audit 
and non-audit service documented by Whisenant et al 2003.  The risk of performing an audit changed because 
of the shift in the regulatory environment.  Audit firms became aware that large firms could fail as a result of 
Andersen’s demise and regulatory scrutiny became more acute as the PCAOB took over the registration, 
standard setting, and inspection functions.  Audit effort increased as the requirements for auditing internal 
controls over financial reporting became effective under PCAOB Auditing Standard 2.  Because of these 
factors that had an impact in audit fees over our sample period, we test our sample on a year by year basis.  
We also pool the years but control for the events described above. 
We obtain managerial ownership data from Compact Disclosure, institutional ownership data from 
Thompson Financial database, data on the number of analysts following a firm from I/B/E/S, auditor changes 
and audit fees data from Audit Analytics, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003)’s Governance Index data from 
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), and accounting and all other data from Compustat. 
3.2 Measurement of Total Audit Fee 
We use the natural logarithm of total audit fees from Audit Fees File of Audit Analytics as a main 
audit fee variable for our empirical analysis. The SEC issued the new audit fee disclosure rules in January 
2003 that require companies to disclose fees paid to the principal auditor in four categories – Audit, Audit-
related, tax, and all other fees.5 Previously, companies were required to disclose fees in three categories. The 
new category, audit related fees, is for fees related to the performance of the audit or review of the registrant’s 
financial statements. Since audit related fees are assurance and related services that are traditionally performed 
by the principal auditor, we use the natural logarithm of audit fees and audit related fees as an audit fee 
variable for our empirical analysis for the years 2003 and 2004.  For years prior to 2003, we use the category 
audit fees, and for years after 2003, we combine audit and audit related.  Dickens and Higgs (2005) document 
the variance in the way companies classify fees into categories. In other words, some companies classified 
                                                 
5 Please refer to the SEC’s rules on Strengthening the Commission’s Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence (Release No. 33-
8183, January 28, 2003) for more details. 
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fees for the auditor to attend the shareholder meeting as an audit fee while other companies classified it as an 
audit related fee.  Therefore, we believe that combining audit and audit related fees in 2003 and later does not 
make those years substantially different from earlier years in terms of the fee measurement.  Therefore, we 
believe the tests across years are comparable for our variables of interest. 
3.3 Measurement of Managerial Ownership 
The managerial ownership variable, MGR, is measured by the total proportion of equity held by the 
executives and the board members and was collected manually from the Compact Disclosure database.6  Prior 
studies show that there is possible presence of both the convergence of interest and entrenchment effects as 
the level of managerial ownership increases. In order to control for this non-linearity inherent in managerial 
ownership, we use two alternative approaches. First, we add the managerial ownership squared variable 
(MGR2) assuming that conditions for entrenchment (e.g., voting power, control for the board of directors, 
status as a founder, etc) are significantly correlated with increase managerial ownership beyond a certain 
threshold. Second, we construct the following three variables, high-ownership (MGR_H), medium-ownership 
(MGR_M), low-ownership (MGR_L) to estimate the piecewise linear regressions:  
MGR_L = GR if MGR < 5%, 
  =  5% if MGR > 5%; 
MGR_M = 0 if MGR < 5% 
  =  MGR – 5% if 5% < MGR< 25%  
  =  20% if MGR > 25% 
MGR_H = 0 if MGR < 25%, 
  =  MGR – 25% if MGR > 25%; 
3.4 Measurement of Shareholder Rights 
Gompers et al. (2003) develop a governance index of agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders using various anti-takeover related activities that restrict shareholder rights, so called G-Index. 
Following prior studies (e.g., Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003; Core et al., 2006;), we form 10 portfolios 
                                                 
6 Specifically, stock ownership by officers, directors, and beneficial owners are included in measuring managerial ownership if they 
hold at least 1,000 shares. 
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such that we classify firms as the strongest shareholder rights group when G-Index is less than 5 ( 5≤G ) and 
the group is coded as 10, and as the weakest shareholder right group when G-Index is greater than 14 
( 14≥G ) and coded as 1. We use this reconstructed categorical variable (GINDEX) as a proxy for outside 
shareholder rights and expect that the larger the index, the stronger the shareholder rights. Since the G-Index 
is available in the IRRC database only in three publication years (2000, 2002, and 2004) during our sample 
period, we assume that the G-index does not change until the next G-index publication year.7 For example, we 
use G-Index published in 2000 for the year 2000 and 2001 since the new G-index is only available in 2002. 
3.5 Measurement of Analyst Coverage 
Analyst coverage (ANACOV) is measured as the number of unique analysts issuing annual earnings 
forecasts for each firm, based on the I/B/E/S Detailed Earnings Forecasts file. One concern in measuring 
analyst coverage is that it is endogenously determined so that the analysts’ preference for following more 
transparent firms with better corporate governance may drive the result (e.g., Lang and Lundholm 1996, Healy, 
Hutton, and Palepu, 1999). To address the potential endogeneity problem, we use residuals from the 
regressions of analyst coverage (ANACOV) on firm size, as in Hong et al. (2000). 
3.6 Empirical Model 
Prior studies on the determinants of audit fees use various proxies for risk-, size-, and complexity-
related factors that generate the outcomes of audit services evident in fees (Simunic 1980, Palmrose 1986, 
Defond, 2003, Francis, 2005, Whisenant, Sankaraguruswamy, and Raghunandan 2003; Khurana and Raman 
2004; Higgs and Skantz 2006). After controlling the factors shown to affect audit fees in those studies, we 
examine the relation between audit pricing and managerial ownership and corporate monitoring activities. 
 
                                                 
7 This assumption may introduce the measurement errors in our empirical analysis. However, Gompers et al. (2003) claim that the 
error is likely to be small due to the stability of G-Index over time. 
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The audit fee models are as follows:8 
ttttt ANACOVGINDEXMGRMGRAFEE 43
2
210 ααααα ++++=  
ttt LEVLNBMSIZEAMCGADTINST 1098765 &_ αααααα ++++++   (1) 
ttttt FOROPSINVRECEMPLISSUELOSS 1514131211 ααααα +++++
 tttt ICFRCGAAGEONBIZNBIG 2019181716 ___4 ααααα +++++
 ttt tFixedEffecSOXADVS ναα ++++ 2221  
tttttt ANACOVGINDEXHMGRMMGRLMGRAFEE 543210 ___ αααααα +++++=  
ttt LEVLNBMSIZEAMCGADTINST 11109876 &_ αααααα ++++++   (2) 
ttttt FOROPSINVRECEMPLISSUELOSS 1615141312 ααααα +++++
 tttt ICFRCGAAGEONBIZNBIG 2120191817 ___4 ααααα +++++
 ttt tFixedEffecSOXADVS ναα ++++ 2221  
As discussed in the hypotheses development section, the coefficients on managerial ownership, 
shareholder rights, and analysts monitoring (α1~α4 for Model 1 and α1~α5 for Model 2) test whether and how 
our treatment variables are associated with audit pricing.  Control variables (explained in Table 1) included in 
the regression model are total institutional ownership (INST), as a proxy for monitoring management, auditor 
change (ADT_CG) since the new auditor may set the first period audit fees below the audit costs (low balling) 
in order to win the client, a dummy variable for big 4 auditors (BIG4). We also include various proxies for 
audit risk as they are known to affect both auditors’ client acceptance decisions and audit fee pricing (e.g., 
Simunic and Stein 1987, Whisenant, Sankaraguruswamy, and Raghunandan 2003). These variables are the 
natural logarithm of a firm’s market value of equity (SIZE), the natural logarithm of a firm’s end-of-year 
equity book-to-market ratio (LNBM), a dummy variable for a firm that incurs a loss in year t (LOSS), and the 
leverage of a firm (LEV). In addition to risk related control variables, the literature provides additional 
guidance on audit fee determinants, which are related to the size and complexity of the business operations of 
the audited firm (e.g., Higgs and Skantz 2006). Such variables are the square root of the total number of 
employees (EMPL), the natural logarithm of one plus the number of business segments and geographic 
segments (N_SEG), the sum of inventory and accounts receivable divided by total assets(INVREC), an 
                                                 
8 Some of these variables may only apply to one year.  For example, ADVS and ICFR only apply to 2004 since audits on internal 
controls over financial reporting were not required until that year.   
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indicator variable for a firm with foreign operations(FOROPS). For a similar reason, we control for the firm’s 
financing activities (ISSUE) by using a dummy variable set equal to 1 when the firm issued equity or long-
term debt during the year that is greater than 5% of total assets and a firm’s mergers and acquisitions activities 
(M&A). 
During our period from 2000-2004 there were a number of events that had an impact on the audit 
market that we control for in the fee model.  In 2002, the clients of Arthur Andersen were forced to obtain a 
new auditor.  When a new auditor is retained, the new auditor may audit some of prior years, particularly if 
comparative financial information is presented.  AU 508, Reports on Audited Financial Statements (AICPA) 
requires the predecessor auditor to perform certain work (¶ 71).  As Andersen was no longer a viable firm, the 
successor would have audited the years presented for comparative purposes.  Thus, we include a control 
variable, AA_CG, for former Andersen clients. 
Research also indicates that compliance with Sarbanes Oxley section 404 also increased fees 
substantially (Krishnan et al, 2008).  The last year of our study includes the implementation year of section 
404 so we include a control variable, ICFR, for firms that acquired that service from their auditor during our 
sample period.   We use an indicator variable for any firm that had an opinion on internal controls over 
financial reporting in Audit Analytics. 
Studies also indicate that firms with material weaknesses in internal control also face higher fees 
(Hoitash et al. 2008, Raghunandan and Rama 2006). Finally, we control for firms that had a material 
weakness in internal controls ADVS.   We use an indicator variable for firms that had an adverse opinion on 
the opinion on internal controls over financial reporting. 
We also include a variable, SOX, for any company that had a fiscal year end after the Sarbanes Oxley 
Act was passed.  The motivation for including this variable is that SOX increased the regulatory complexity of 
audits and would have thus had an impact on fees.  Examples where SOX would have changed the audit 
include additional meetings between the audit partner and the audit committee, greater scrutiny of the controls 
over the whistle blowing process, and tests for loans to corporate officers and directors. 
4.  Empirical Results 
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Tables 3 and 4 report the results of models 1 and 2 respectively.  Model 1 includes the managerial 
ownership variables (MGR) as a main treatment variable after controlling for non-linearity using the squared 
ownership variable (MGR2) and Model 2 includes the three different levels of managerial ownership (MGR_L, 
MGR_M, MGR_H) for piecewise regressions, allowing for two changes in the slope coefficient on managerial 
ownership.  In each table we report the model regression results for each year from 2000 to 2004.  We also 
report the composite regression results for the entire period. 
4.1 Sample Characteristics 
Our sample consists of 4,979 firms over the 2000-2004 period.  For each of the years from 2000 to 
2004, we had 596; 894; 1,200; 1199; and 1090 firms in each respectively.  Our data was constrained primarily 
by the availability of managerial ownership, institutional ownership, Gompers Index information and analyst 
data.  Table 2 reports in panel A the sample characteristics for the total data set.  Panel B reports Pearson 
Correlations. 
 The mean proportion of equity held by managers for our sample is 6.8% and a median of 1.7. The 
smaller median stake than the mean in our sample suggests that the distribution is skewed to the right. 
Although the majority of the firms have small managerial ownership, in 19% of the total sample firms 
managers owned more than 10% of the firm, which confirms the prevalence of significant managerial 
ownership in the United States. Our analyst coverage variable has a mean and median of 1.93 and 2.07 
respectively indicating approximately two analysts following each firm. 
 The mean and median of Gompers index (GINDEX) for our sample are 5.85 and 6.00, respectively. 
Consistent with the distribution statistics in Gompers et al. (2003, Table II on page 116), the ten deciles are 
similar but not identical in size and more democratic portfolio (weaker anti-take over provision groups) are 
bigger in size for our sample. 
Concerning our dependent variable, audit fees, the mean (median) audit fees is 13.67 (13.55). 
Approximately 92% of firms in the sample are audited by the big four. 
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4.2 Control Variables  
As discussed previously, fees over that period increased significantly because of various regulatory 
changes impacting the conducts of audits. These changes included the collapse of Arthur Andersen and 
subsequent absorption of its clients by the remaining firms, the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act, the 
creation of the PCAOB, the requirements of Auditing Standard 2 to report on internal control over financial 
reporting in accordance with Sarbanes Oxley section 404 and the identification of companies that had material 
weaknesses in internal controls.  As such, we have included variables to control for the effect on fees for these 
events and the impact on audit fee. 
The variable AA_CC, for firms that switched from Andersen after January 11, 2002, was significant 
in the 2002 year for both years but not in the composite regression.  In both models the other three variables 
(ICFR, ADVS and SOX) that we use to control for changes in fees over time are highly significant.  The 
variable, ICFR, indicating whether a company had a report on internal controls over financial reporting was 
highly significant in 2004, the year that regulation began to be phased in, and in the overall composite 
regression.  ADVS, an indicator variable for firms that had an adverse opinion on internal controls was highly 
significant in 2004 and in the composite regression.  This result is consistent with the results of Raghunandan 
and Rama 2006 and Hoitash et al. 2008.  The variable SOX, representing any company that had a fiscal period 
after the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act, is highly significant in the composite regression.  We believe that 
controlling for these events that impact fees over time allows us to draw inferences from the composite fee 
model. 
All of the control variables in the model are highly significant except for percentage of institutional 
investors, whether a firm had a Big 4 auditor, and whether a firm issued stock or debt during the year, none of 
which were significant. 
4.3   Managerial Ownership and Audit Fees 
We model managerial ownership under the two models.  In model one, we use the squared managerial 
ownership in order to control for a presumable non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and 
18 
 
audit fees, up to certain ownership threshold. The results of model one indicate that fees are negatively related 
to managerial ownership. This result holds for 2001 to 2004 and the composite model. In model two, we run 
piecewise regressions to show the non-linearity using various cut-offs in managerial ownership. In table 4, we 
use 5% and 25% as main cut-off points and find the negative effect of managerial ownership on audit fees for 
the lower level of ownership (MGR_L). The results are consistent with the alignment hypothesis whereas 
audits are priced consistent with the view that management who is compensated to align his/her interests with 
shareholders will act to maximize shareholder wealth.9  Note that we find some limited evidence on the 
entrenchment effect for firms with higher managerial ownership exceeding 25% (MGR_H). Further analysis 
shows that the positive coefficient between managerial ownership and audit fees are mainly driven by the 
firms whose ownership level is between 30% and 60%. This result is consistent with prior studies that show 
the non-linear relation between ownership and agency costs. Considering the fact that managerial ownership is 
well diversified for firms in the United States, the number of firms that exceed the alignment effect thresholds 
would be very small.10 Thus, our results are consistent with the alignment effect argument. With regard to 
economic significance of the impact of managerial ownership on audit fees, the reported coefficient on MGR 
of -0.0094 in Table 3 translates into a decrease in audit fees by 1.61% if MGR increases by 1.71% (i.e., the 
median MGR as reported in Table 2). As shown in Table 4, the coefficient on MGR_L is -0.0356 and thus 
audit fees increase by 6.1% if MGR increases by 1.71%. This finding confirms not only the alignment effect 
of share ownership on audit fees is more pronounced when managerial ownership level is low, which is the 
case for most US companies, but also the effect is economically significant. 
4.4 Shareholder Rights, Analysts Monitoring and Audit Fees 
 As shown in Table 1 and 2, the Gompers Index variable (GINDEX) in models 1 and 2 is significant in 
three of the five years and it is highly significant in the composite model. This result is consistent with the 
idea that auditors view the board as another form of monitoring, and price this accordingly. As a 
complementary monitoring mechanism, we examine the effect of analysts monitoring variable (ANACOV) as 
                                                 
9 We cannot find the positive association for firms in the highest ownership group, exceeding 60%. 
10 From simple mathematical calculations using the estimated coefficients from the regressions (Table 3), the thresholds 
are all over 40% of ownership, except for the year 2000.  
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well. The result for ANACOV variable is similar for both models.  The coefficient is negative and significant 
in 2001, 2003 and 2004 and in the composite regressions. Because auditors consciously price the risk of the 
firm (Bedard and Johnstone 2006, Dickens et al. 2008), the results imply that auditors implicitly view 
analysts’ coverage as a form of monitoring that reduces information risk. Those two monitoring mechanisms 
also reduce audit fees with economic significance. For example, one level up in GINDEX deciles leads to a 
1.4% decrease in audit fees, while one more analysts following reduces audit fees by 6.2%, on average. 
4.5 Robustness Checks 
We perform a variety of sensitivity checks to examine the robustness of our results. Firstly, as we 
discussed in 3.2, we use the category audit fees for years prior to 2003 and we combine audit and audit related 
for years after 2003. Since the amount of audit related fees are sometimes quite significant11, it is possible that 
the audit fees under this new definition introduce some bias toward the hypothesized relationships. In order to 
make sure that our result is not sensitive to the definition of audit fees, we run the same regressions using the 
same audit fees variable for the whole sample period. We find that the result is virtually identical. Secondly, 
we employ various cut-off points in defining the low/medium/high level of managerial ownership such as 3% 
and 20% of ownership and top 3rd and 4th quintile of ownership. The result is qualitatively the same. Lastly, 
we add some more control variables such as liquidity, profitability and growth in the regression models and 
find the very similar result. 
5.  Conclusion 
This paper answers the call of Hay et al. (2006) to address the need to further explore the relationship 
between audit fees and governance.  We use a large sample (almost 5,000 firms) to explore the relationship 
between audit fees and managerial ownership, and corporate monitoring (shareholder rights and analysts 
coverage).  We find that managerial ownership is associated with lower fees consistent with the alignment 
hypothesis whereas managerial ownership aligns management and shareholder interests.  We also find that 
                                                 
11 For example, according to General Electric 2007 proxy statement, audit fees paid to KPMG were $85.8 million while 
audit-related fees were $20.6 million in the year 2006. 
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fees are lower when corporate monitoring is stronger.  In our tests of corporate monitoring, we find that 
shareholder rights, as proxied by the Gomper’s index and analyst following are associated with lower audit 
fees. 
The results may help assist auditor firms in identifying criteria for formally setting fees and 
considering factors in the client acceptance criteria.  Further, our results may assist board compensation 
committees in understanding the relationship in management compensation and firm risk.  Future research 
may consider the relationship between the type of managerial compensation and audit fees. 
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Table 1: Variable Definitions 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
AFEE Total audit fees as measured by the natural logarithm of total audit fees (includes audit  related fees in 2003 and 2004) 
TREATMENT VARIABLES 
MGR Total percentage of  managerial and board ownership at year t as obtained from Compact Disclosure  
MGR2 The managerial ownership squared  (to control for non-linearity) 
MGR_L, M, H Variables for piecewise regressions; MGR-L(5% below), M (between 5% and 25%), H (25% above) 
GINDEX Investor Protection Index from Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick  (2003)  
ANACOV Analysts’ Coverage measured by the natural logarithm of the number of unique analysts  following the company based on the I/B/E/S detailed earnings forecasts files.   
CONTROL VARIABLES 
SIZE Natural logarithm of market value of equity  
INST Percentage of total institutional ownership obtained from the Thomson Financial Database 
ADT_CG Indicator variable for auditor changes (1 is an auditor change, 0 otherwise) 
AA_CC Indicator variable for an auditor change from Arthur Anderson after Jan 11, 2002, the date of that the firm announced that documents had been shredded.  
ICFR Indicator variable if the firm received an audit opinion for internal controls over financial  reporting  
ADVS Indicator variable for an adverse opinion in internal controls over financial reporting 
LNBM Natural logarithm of Book-to-Market [#60 / (#25 × #199)] 
M&A Indicator variable set for 1 if the firm had a  mergers and acquisitions [ftnte#1]; 0  otherwise.   
LEV Leverage, measured as debt to assets [(#34 + #9) / #6] 
LOSS Indicator variable set to 1 if the firm had a loss for the year; 0 otherwise  
ISSUE Indicator variable for stock and long-term debt issuance: 1 if stock and long-term debt (#108 + #111) for past three years are more than 5% of total assets; 0 otherwise 
EMPL Squared root of the number of employees [#29] 
INVREC Inventory and Account Receivables [(#2+#3] / #6] 
FOROPS Indicator variable set to one if the firm had foreign operations, 0 otherwise 
BIG4 Indicator variable set to one for firms with a Big 4 Auditors, 0 otherwise 
N_BIZ Natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of business segments [#4] 
N_GEO Natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of geographical segments [#5] 
SOX Indicator variable for the date after the SOX was signed into law (1 for any fiscal year after July 30, 2002); 0 otherwise  
Note: numbers in the above table indicate the annual Compustat data number. 
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[Table 2] Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics among Selected Variables 
VARIABLE N Mean Std. Dev 25% Median 75% 
AFEE 4,979 13.6794 1.1562 12.8479 13.5580 14.4372
MGR 4,979 6.8053 13.2675 0.5500 1.7100 6.5000
MGR_L 4,979 2.3655 1.9605 0.5500 1.7100 5.0000
MGR_M 4,979 2.9584 6.0724 0.0000 0.0000 1.5000
MGR_H 4,979 1.4815 7.8363 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
GINDEX 4,979 5.8576 2.4525 4.0000 6.0000 8.0000
ANACOV 4,979 1.9326 0.9018 1.3863 2.0794 2.6391
INST 4,979 66.3891 18.6615 54.5455 68.9139 80.5627
ADT_CG 4,979 0.0747 0.2630 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
M&A 4,979 0.4260 0.4945 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
SIZE 4,979 7.4063 1.5759 6.3548 7.2764 8.3924
LNBM 4,979 -0.8560 0.7170 -1.2599 -0.7873 -0.4059
LEV 4,979 0.2331 0.1725 0.0716 0.2353 0.3540
LOSS 4,979 0.2342 0.4235 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
ISSUE 4,979 0.8682 0.3383 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
EMPL 4,979 3.3109 3.0682 1.4142 2.3664 4.0743
INVREC 4,979 0.2447 0.1648 0.1087 0.2217 0.3393
FOROPS 4,979 0.3517 0.4775 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
BIG4 4,979 0.9199 0.2715 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
N_BIZ 4,979 1.0788 0.6011 0.6931 1.0986 1.6094
N_GEO  4,979 1.1229 0.6335 0.6931 1.0986 1.6094
AA_CG 4,979 0.0492 0.2163 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
ADVS 4,979 0.1703 0.3759 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
SOX 4,979 0.4115 0.4922 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
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Panel B: Pearson Correlations 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] 
[1] AFEE 1.0000             
[2] MGR -0.1542 1.0000         
[3] GINDEX -0.1647 0.1962 1.0000         
[4] ANACOV 0.3945 -0.0849 -0.0176 1.0000        
[5] INST 0.0982 -0.2042 -0.0395 0.2563 1.0000        
[6] ADT_CG -0.0657 0.0176 -0.0009 -0.0257 -0.0158 1.0000        
[7] M&A 0.2040 -0.0583 -0.0903 0.0666 -0.0217 0.0132 1.0000        
[8] SIZE 0.6474 -0.0997 -0.1008 0.7140 0.1433 -0.0581 0.1222 1.0000        
[9] LNBM -0.1381 -0.0058 -0.0283 -0.3430 -0.1455 0.0512 0.0704 -0.4985 1.0000        
[10] LEV 0.2320 -0.0739 -0.1318 0.0141 -0.0284 0.0269 0.1749 0.0552 0.0693 1.0000        
[11] LOSS -0.0953 0.0011 0.1130 -0.1616 -0.1364 0.0214 -0.0179 -0.3184 0.2231 0.0680 1.0000         
[12] ISSUE 0.1168 -0.0512 -0.0534 0.1237 0.0861 0.0000 0.0918 0.0702 0.0014 0.3093 0.0359 1.0000        
[13] EMPL 0.5468 -0.0827 -0.1139 0.3810 0.0342 -0.0280 0.0605 0.5987 -0.1263 0.1372 -0.1512 0.0806 1.0000        
[14] INVREC -0.0232 0.0108 -0.0666 -0.2315 0.0795 -0.0262 -0.0781 -0.1689 0.0674 -0.1277 -0.1122 -0.0837 0.0806 1.0000       
[15] FOROPS  0.1554 -0.0350 0.0302 0.0176 0.0663 -0.0013 -0.0331 0.0329 -0.0834 -0.1437 0.0337 -0.0302 -0.0410 0.0536 1.0000      
[16] BIG4 0.1226 -0.0502 -0.0162 0.0629 0.0681 0.0276 -0.0120 0.0675 -0.0422 -0.0381 -0.0027 0.0425 0.0273 -0.0326 0.0501 1.0000      
[17] N_BIZ 0.1494 -0.0731 -0.1676 -0.0473 -0.0222 -0.0043 0.1339 0.0526 0.0961 0.0655 -0.0330 0.0357 0.0399 0.0809 -0.0458 -0.0165 1.0000  
[18] N_GEO  0.2373 -0.0664 -0.0087 0.0582 0.0521 0.0050 0.0028 0.0965 -0.0761 -0.1096 0.0373 -0.0103 0.0241 0.0962 0.3468 0.0301 0.1164 1.0000  
[19] AA_CG -0.0675 0.0191 0.0022 -0.0117 -0.0156 0.8006 0.0125 -0.0581 0.0582 0.0369 0.0343 0.0172 -0.0202 -0.0287 -0.0100 0.0637 0.0053 -0.0068 1.0000  
[20] ICFR 0.3278 0.0043 0.0017 0.0445 0.1615 0.0617 0.0332 0.0928 -0.0868 -0.0162 -0.0777 0.0011 -0.0155 -0.0568 0.0535 0.0904 -0.0039 0.0112 -0.1031 1.0000
[21] ADVS 0.1322 0.0168 0.0315 -0.0338 0.0251 -0.0037 0.0032 -0.0242 0.0083 -0.0010 0.0396 -0.0101 -0.0189 0.0068 0.0496 0.0117 -0.0059 0.0369 -0.0331 0.3208 1.0000
[22] SOX 0.3010 0.2929 -0.0177 0.0080 0.0228 0.1114 -0.1274 -0.0032 0.0805 -0.1218 -0.0467 -0.0625 -0.0266 -0.0458 -0.0709 0.0935 0.1852 -0.0041 0.0372 -0.1902 0.5418
See Table 1 for definition of variables. Correlation coefficients that are statistically significant at the 5% level are shown in boldface type. 
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[Table 3] Regression Results by Year – Model 1 
AUDIT FEES  
Year 2000  Year 2001 Year 2002 Year 2003 Year 2004 ALL 
MGR -0.0041 -0.0104 -0.0108 -0.0115 -0.0085 -0.0094 
 [0.87] [2.92]*** [3.52]*** [3.49]*** [2.98]*** [6.44]*** 
MGR2 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 [1.21] [2.59]*** [3.13]*** [3.40]*** [2.94]*** [6.25]*** 
GINDEX -0.0270 -0.0161 -0.0060 -0.0137 -0.0070 -0.0139 
 [2.48]** [1.90]* [0.74] [1.75]* [0.92] [3.75]*** 
ANACOV -0.0188 -0.0763 -0.0521 -0.1406 -0.0894 -0.0617 
 [0.32] [1.83]* [1.48] [4.48]*** [3.09]*** [3.81]*** 
INST -0.0019 -0.0011 -0.0006 -0.0010 0.0026 -0.0005 
 [0.92] [0.82] [0.46] [0.84] [2.39]** [0.84] 
ADT_CG -0.3230 -0.1521 -0.3509 -0.2329 0.0509 -0.1281 
 [1.42] [1.35] [2.24]** [2.38]** [0.61] [2.31]** 
M&A -0.0243 0.0596 0.1204 0.1384 0.1104 0.0941 
 [0.39] [1.41] [3.07]*** [3.64]*** [3.07]*** [5.10]*** 
SIZE 0.4379 0.4469 0.4356 0.5478 0.4774 0.4589 
 [7.05]*** [10.15]*** [12.50]*** [16.26]*** [14.30]*** [26.50]*** 
LNBM 0.3345 0.3459 0.3253 0.3227 0.2807 0.3335 
 [5.70]*** [7.01]*** [7.42]*** [8.58]*** [7.07]*** [17.32]*** 
LEV 1.4086 1.3533 1.2199 1.3927 1.1838 1.3235 
 [5.84]*** [7.84]*** [8.92]*** [10.13]*** [8.62]*** [19.71]*** 
LOSS 0.2846 0.1822 0.2782 0.2217 0.2499 0.2289 
 [3.04]*** [3.48]*** [5.47]*** [4.46]*** [4.32]*** [9.31]*** 
ISSUE -0.1503 -0.0365 0.0535 0.0751 -0.0166 0.0079 
 [1.60] [0.61] [0.93] [1.58] [0.34] [0.32] 
EMPL 0.1046 0.0970 0.1012 0.0774 0.0859 0.0933 
 [3.91]*** [4.09]*** [5.35]*** [4.45]*** [5.01]*** [10.39]*** 
INVREC 0.8386 0.7850 0.9240 0.8516 0.9111 0.8318 
 [2.98]*** [3.76]*** [5.33]*** [5.03]*** [5.51]*** [10.12]*** 
FOROPS 0.1689 0.1447 0.1945 0.1893 0.1910 0.1820 
 [2.72]*** [3.18]*** [4.69]*** [4.78]*** [5.02]*** [9.52]*** 
BIG4 -0.0325 0.0640 0.0283 0.2512 0.1557 0.0448 
 [0.43] [1.31] [0.22] [1.80]* [1.42] [1.24] 
N_BIZ 0.0109 0.0405 0.0545 0.0883 0.0625 0.0485 
 [0.22] [1.15] [1.59] [2.93]*** [2.04]** [3.15]*** 
N_GEO 0.1652 0.2174 0.2018 0.1952 0.1399 0.1813 
 [3.05]*** [5.50]*** [5.34]*** [5.58]*** [4.07]*** [10.62]*** 
AA_CG   0.3383   0.1182 
   [2.07]**   [1.62] 
ICFR     0.6237 0.6145 
     [14.42]*** [15.30]*** 
ADVS     0.3860 0.3787 
     [5.55]*** [5.53]*** 
SOX      0.3159 
      [7.26]*** 
Constant 9.7458 9.4250 9.3538 8.8786 8.7898 9.1529 
 [27.28]*** [23.64]*** [30.22]*** [17.26]*** [32.21]*** [50.54]*** 
Observations 596 894 1,200 1,199 1,090 4,979 
R-squared 0.6902 0.7397 0.7037 0.7378 0.7748 0.7591 
 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the .1,.05 and .01 levels respectively;  Variable definitions are in Table 1.  
Year and industry dummies are included in the regressions but not reported for simplicity. 
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[Table 4] Regression Results by Year – Model 2 
AUDIT FEES  
Year 2000  Year 2001 Year 2002 Year 2003 Year 2004 ALL 
MGR_L -0.0312 -0.0632 -0.0352 -0.0283 -0.0243 -0.0356 
 [1.50] [4.77]*** [2.74]*** [2.28]** [1.88]* [5.82]*** 
MGR_M 0.0029 0.0046 -0.0027 -0.0051 -0.0016 -0.0006 
 [0.39] [0.94] [0.64] [1.09] [0.37] [0.30] 
MGR_H 0.0026 0.0014 0.0018 0.0031 0.0012 0.0018 
 [0.78] [0.57] [0.79] [1.41] [0.60] [1.73]* 
GINDEX -0.0275 -0.0162 -0.0061 -0.0139 -0.0076 -0.0143 
 [2.52]** [1.92]* [0.75] [1.77]* [0.99] [3.84]*** 
ANACOV -0.0120 -0.0785 -0.0465 -0.1383 -0.0893 -0.0589 
 [0.20] [1.88]* [1.32] [4.41]*** [3.10]*** [3.64]*** 
INST -0.0019 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0010 0.0028 -0.0004 
 [0.93] [0.60] [0.53] [0.86] [2.58]*** [0.74] 
ADT_CG -0.3408 -0.1511 -0.3485 -0.2310 0.0485 -0.1290 
 [1.51] [1.36] [2.23]** [2.37]** [0.58] [2.34]** 
M&A -0.0209 0.0536 0.1206 0.1369 0.1084 0.0933 
 [0.34] [1.28] [3.08]*** [3.59]*** [3.01]*** [5.06]*** 
SIZE 0.4257 0.4295 0.4254 0.5418 0.4731 0.4493 
 [6.69]*** [9.88]*** [12.35]*** [16.00]*** [14.19]*** [25.89]*** 
LNBM 0.3270 0.3278 0.3200 0.3194 0.2781 0.3276 
 [5.61]*** [6.71]*** [7.34]*** [8.50]*** [6.97]*** [17.10]*** 
LEV 1.3961 1.3363 1.2140 1.3947 1.1908 1.3217 
 [5.89]*** [7.89]*** [8.94]*** [10.16]*** [8.69]*** [19.80]*** 
LOSS 0.2798 0.1872 0.2765 0.2195 0.2505 0.2281 
 [2.97]*** [3.64]*** [5.43]*** [4.42]*** [4.33]*** [9.29]*** 
ISSUE -0.1522 -0.0324 0.0548 0.0747 -0.0173 0.0088 
 [1.61] [0.55] [0.95] [1.57] [0.35] [0.36] 
EMPL 0.1038 0.0949 0.1003 0.0766 0.0856 0.0924 
 [3.93]*** [4.07]*** [5.34]*** [4.38]*** [5.00]*** [10.35]*** 
INVREC 0.8544 0.8358 0.9300 0.8595 0.9282 0.8468 
 [3.06]*** [4.00]*** [5.35]*** [5.05]*** [5.62]*** [10.32]*** 
FOROPS 0.1676 0.1349 0.1907 0.1875 0.1904 0.1789 
 [2.71]*** [2.99]*** [4.61]*** [4.73]*** [4.99]*** [9.36]*** 
BIG4 -0.0274 0.0760 0.0282 0.2545 0.1547 0.0485 
 [0.37] [1.58] [0.21] [1.82]* [1.41] [1.35] 
N_BIZ 0.0127 0.0451 0.0566 0.0919 0.0663 0.0518 
 [0.25] [1.29] [1.65]* [3.06]*** [2.15]** [3.35]*** 
N_GEO 0.1655 0.2191 0.2032 0.1979 0.1413 0.1833 
 [3.06]*** [5.57]*** [5.38]*** [5.65]*** [4.10]*** [10.73]*** 
AA_CG   0.3327   0.1174 
   [2.04]**   [1.61] 
ICFR     0.6257 0.6187 
     [14.43]*** [15.35]*** 
ADVS     0.3846 0.3773 
     [5.54]*** [5.51]*** 
SOX      0.3138 
      [7.18]*** 
Constant 9.8726 9.5535 9.4385 8.9203 8.8078 9.2240 
 [26.90]*** [23.08]*** [30.65]*** [17.45]*** [32.43]*** [50.91]*** 
Observations 596 894 1,200 1,199 1090 4,979 
R-squared 0.6914 0.7449 0.7046 0.7383 0.7749 0.7600 
 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the .1,.05 and .01 levels respectively;  Variable definitions are in Table 1. 
Year and industry dummies are included in the regressions but not reported for simplicity. 
 
